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Negotiating innovation:   
Product renewal as the outcome of a complex bargaining process 
 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, it is argued that innovation can be the result of a repetitive, multi-actor 
negotiation process. We present the case of an environment-related product 
innovation in a large multinational company which emerged as the outcome of a 
complex interaction process in which numerous external and internal actors 
negotiated to safeguard their own interests. This negotiation perspective challenges 
conventional economic views of innovations, in which new products and processes 
are regarded as exogenous variables, the outcomes of deliberately planned research, 
or the combination of technology (pushing) and market (pulling) inducements. 
Instead, innovation may be a non-linear, unpredictable process which involves 
multiple actors with divergent interests and which leads to outcomes that are 
collectively acceptable but not necessarily (sub)optimal. 
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Negotiating innovation:  
Product renewal as the outcome of a complex bargaining process 
 
Over the past few decades, many firms have been engaged in an ongoing struggle to 
deal effectively with their rapidly changing technological and competitive 
environments (Duysters and De Man, 2003). In today’s global industries, the main 
engine of economic change is often associated with technological progress. 
Technological change has posed major threats to incumbent organizations and opened 
up windows of opportunities for new entrants. Technology competition has, therefore, 
become one of the main themes on the agenda of corporate managers worldwide. In 
view of these developments, it is of eminent importance to thoroughly understand the 
specific characteristics and drivers of technological change. 
For many years, the nature of technological change remained a ‘black box’ in the 
academic literature (Rosenberg, 1982). In an attempt to open up this ‘black box’, 
many innovation studies have examined technological change as a firm-controlled 
process. In this tradition, innovation scholars have described the dynamics of 
technological innovation (Dosi, 1984, 1988; Nelson and Winter, 1982). There is a 
growing consensus in the innovation literature that in order to understand the specific 
characteristics and drivers of technological dynamics, we need a deeper understanding 
of the underlying mechanisms which facilitate or hamper technological innovation.  
 
The origin of technological innovation has long been debated in terms of ‘technology 
push’ versus ‘demand pull’. Whereas up to the 1950s the innovation process was 
generally described in terms of technology push, in the 1960s and 1970s, much of the 
literature stressed technology pull factors as the most important drivers of innovation. 
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In the former case, organizations engage in research and development (R&D) which 
is driven by internal actors and which results in new products or processes. In the 
latter case, organizations respond to external inducements, such as new market 
demand or government regulation, to which no adequate responses can be formulated 
with their existing stocks of technical knowledge. More recently, we have witnessed 
increasing consensus in the innovation literature about the need for a combination of 
pull and push factors (Barabba, 1995; Dosi, 1982; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979; 
Piper and Naghshpour, 1996). 
In particular, it is increasingly recognized that we are moving away from the classical 
‘closed’ model of innovation towards an ‘open’ innovation model in which the 
external environment (consumers as well as other companies) play an increasingly 
important role (see, e.g., Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation arises from external 
acquisition of know-how by means of strategic alliances, spin-ins, but also by means 
of interaction with major customers. The recent innovation management literature has 
focused not only on the internal organization of innovation, stressing the importance 
of limited structure, low-cost trials, and good pacing (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997), 
but has also highlighted the external acquisition of know-how by means of strategic 
alliances, mergers, and acquisitions (Duysters and De Man, 2003; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002; Vanhaverbeke, Noorderhaven, and Duysters, 2002) as well as the 
involvement of suppliers and customers in the innovation process (Jolly, 1997; Primo 
and Amundson, 2002).  
 
In the business community, more attempts are being made to involve suppliers and 
customers in the early stages of the product development process (see, e.g., Wasti and 
Liker, 1999). The business community has become increasingly aware of the 
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important aspects of negotiations between major players in the innovation process. 
However, in spite of the widespread use of customer involvement in, for example, 
prototyping, and the involvement of suppliers in the innovation process, the academic 
literature still tends to ignore the specific aspects of negotiation as an important factor 
in the innovation process.  
In order to fill this void, we present evidence of an environmentally benign product 
innovation in a large company that was shaped by a complex pattern of negotiations 
between a host of internal and external actors who were involved in different stages of 
the process that culminated in innovation.1) The present paper adds important insights 
to the innovation literature because it presents a novel perspective: innovation as the 
outcome of a negotiation process, a multi-faceted, continuous pushing and pulling 
among the external and internal actors involved.  
We also add to the negotiation literature by addressing bargaining in the context of 
innovation. Business organizations have been represented as (shifting) coalitions of 
actors (Cyert and March, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983; Murnighan, 1986; Pearce, 
Stevenson, and Porter, 1986; Pfeffer, 1992) who often bargain collectively to enhance 
the promotion of their private interests. Companies also negotiate with their external 
environments (Cyert and March, 1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Phillips, 
Lawrence, and Hardy, 2000). Negotiations in and around organizations are driven by 
divergent interests and are enabled by unevenly distributed information and 
uncertainty as to the distribution of outcomes (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998; Putnam, 
1990). The bargaining dynamics of innovations, which are central to this paper, have 
not been previously addressed in the negotiation literature. 
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Product innovation shaped by a complex process of negotiations was the outcome of a 
study in which we focused on the interaction dynamics among actors involved in 
innovation. We were interested in knowing what actors in and around business 
organizations are directly and indirectly involved in innovations. Apart from 
identifying critical actors, we investigated how and why these actors interacted with 
one another. The extant literature tends to implicitly assume that innovations occur as 
the joint optimization of technological problems for which organizations need novel 
solutions (Inkpen and Crossan, 1996; Kogut, 1988). Our feeling was that internal and 
external actors involved in innovation do not necessarily cooperate willingly because 
they may have conflicting interests (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998; Cyert and March, 
1992; Hardy and Phillips, 1998; Oliver, 1990). 
We addressed our research questions through an extensive case study of an 
environmentally benign product innovation in a large company. The focal 
organization had a strong innovation track record. By focusing on environmental 
regulation that induced a large firm to engage in innovation, we considered the 
possibility of divergent interests. The case study is a suitable method to investigate 
such complex social interactions (Yin, 1994). 
 
The paper is organized in three sections. First, we explain the empirical method 
applied and elucidate the selection of the case. Second, we describe relevant aspects 
of the focal organization: its general and environment-specific antecedents, its 
environmental management structure, and the innovation process. The antecedents 
and the management structure indicate the historical and structural context within 
which environmentally relevant innovations are embedded. Finally, we relate the 
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outcomes of the case study to the extant literature and make suggestions for an 
innovative research agenda. 
 
EMPIRICAL METHOD 
 
Our empirical investigation of the interaction dynamics of actors involved in 
negotiation consisted of an extensive case study. We adopted the case study method 
because of its suitability for analysing complex interactions of relevant factors. While 
the case study may present limitations in  terms of analytical rigour, dealing with 
large numbers of observations, and generalising context-specific outcomes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), it is a suitable method to observe the concurrence of multiple 
causal factors (Ragin, 1987), to contextualize these causes (March, 1979), and to trace 
the unfolding of processes (Yin, 1994). 
The focal case was a multinational company, labelled as Eureka for reasons of 
confidentiality. The organization was selected because we expected that its very large 
size and its reputation as a technically advanced company would enable the 
observation of complex interaction patterns around innovations. We analysed the 
company at the divisional level because this was the highest echelon that was likely to 
show relatively coherent patterns of influence around particular innovations (Eureka’s 
different divisions were involved in divergent businesses). The study focused on 
environmental management practices, the ways in which the selected division dealt 
with issues related to the environment. In the environmental arena, both conflict and 
cooperation are likely to occur (Lévêque and Nadaï, 1995; Westley and Vredenburg, 
1991). Ecological and economic imperatives involve ‘win-win’ situations when 
companies redesign production processes to save inputs and thus prevent pollution 
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(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995) or seize new market opportunities stemming from 
the demand for environment-friendly products (Elkington and Burke, 1989).  Firms 
also realise that their (long-term) performance is contingent on the congruence of the 
environmental impact of their activities with societal expectations (Hart, 1995). In the 
last thirty years, rising expectations have increasingly induced companies to be 
sensitive to environmental concerns in order to meet environmental legislation and to 
retain their societal legitimacy (Hoffman, 1997). Companies may thus engage in 
environmentally inspired actions for reasons of financial pay-off, regulative 
compliance, or societal legitimacy. Seizing ‘win-win’ opportunities, meeting 
legislative imperatives, or responding to calls for different business practices requires 
concerted actions by organizational actors, which may result in novel products or 
processes. 
Interviews provided the main source of information. They are an effective means to 
collect sensitive, specific, unambiguous, and in-depth information (Mishler, 1986; 
Yin, 1994). The interviewer’s physical proximity establishes a climate that is 
conducive to the transfer of confidential information. The direct interaction between 
interviewer and respondent enables the immediate clarification of ambiguous 
statements and the further elaboration of salient information. Interviews also allow for 
the empirical establishment of causal relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). Spurious relations can be ruled out by analysing at the micro level 
and by directly addressing the inducements of the actors involved. We conducted the 
interviews with the help of a semi-structured questionnaire, highlighting different 
aspects of a respondent’s relationship with important actors inside and outside the 
focal organization. The first interview was conducted with the division’s 
environmental coordinator. He was the central actor, the person who fulfilled a pivotal 
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role in environmental management on behalf of his division. The environmental 
coordinator named internal and external actors whom he perceived as important. 
Through this ‘snowball sampling’ (Simon and Burstein, 1985) or ‘names generator’ 
(Angot and Josserand, 1999) method, peripheral actors were identified. They were 
subsequently interviewed on their relationship with the central actor. Interviews were 
also conducted with other actors who were expected to have salient information. 
Overall, seven internal and three external actors were interviewed: two representatives 
of the divisional environmental department, three senior managers (of a major 
business unit, the divisional purchasing department, and the divisional marketing 
department), two representatives of a corporate research laboratory, a national 
government official, a representative of the European Commission, and a competitor. 
In-depth conversations of about one hour each were held with these respondents in the 
course of 2000. The interviews covered topics like the environment-related objectives 
pursued by the respondents, the environment-related importance they attributed to 
other actors, the nature and frequency of their contacts with others, the environmental 
claims or expectations they had regarding other parties, their own responsiveness to 
demands by others, the reasons for considering other actors, and the evolution of their 
environmental relationships with other parties. All the interviews were tape-recorded 
and transcribed. Personal observations, a visit to a research laboratory, and 37 
secondary documents (including annual financial and environmental reports, 
brochures, governmental reports, and newspaper articles) provided additional 
information. Interesting non-verbal observations were also noted. Likewise, all 
passages from the archival data pertaining to environment-related innovations and 
interactions among major actors involved or providing generic background 
information were transcribed.  
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All the transcripts were analysed with the help of an effective qualitative software 
package, Atlas/ti (Weitzman and Miles, 1995). This package facilitates the selection, 
coding, bundling, and analysis of qualitative data. Chunks of text that we interpreted 
as relevant were electronically connected to pre-established, theoretically inspired 
codes (such as ‘acquisition of knowledge’ or ‘formal influence’) and ‘emerging’ 
codes (i.e., categories related to unexpected, salient evidence). For each code, Atlas/ti 
then grouped the earmarked passages from different sources; this facilitated the 
analysis of similarities, differences, and complementarities of data related to a 
particular issue. On the basis of the analysed passages of all the (pre-established and 
emerging) codes, a case report was written. This report was anonymised and 
converted into a case description. 
An unexpected process of innovation clearly emerged out of the data. Emergent 
findings that are firmly grounded in the evidence can shed new light on the body of 
theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989). The representation of innovation as the 
outcome of a bargaining process seems to provide such a novel perspective.  We 
would like to emphasize that our focus is on incremental innovations. In the literature, 
it is generally acknowledged that, although customer interaction is important for 
incremental innovations, its role in determining radical innovations is much more 
contested (Christensen, 1997, Vercauteren, 2004). Several case studies have, 
however, pointed out that radical innovations may also be the result of the input of 
major users (Jolly, 1997; Vercauteren, 2004).  
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INNOVATION AS A NEGOTIATION 
 
Antecedents 
Eureka was created over a century ago. Starting out as a small, craftsmanly family 
business, it has evolved into a huge industrial corporation, with over 200,000 
employees in 25 countries.2) In its 200 subsidiaries, the company manufactures over 
1,500 different product families for both professional and consumer markets. It has 
the public image of an innovative supplier of branded quality products. Eureka’s 
products are sold all over the world. Europe is by far the most important market, 
followed by North America and Asia. Eureka’s shares are traded on several stock 
exchanges. In the last ten years, the company has gone through several rounds of 
restructuring to improve its poor financial performance. 
The focal division is the largest of Eureka’s six divisions, representing 40% of the 
company’s overall sales. Worldwide, the division is among the five largest in its 
sector. Its headquarters, which leave the impression of a typical bureaucracy, are 
situated in the Netherlands. All production activities take place in other countries. 
Though technical product performance is important in the division’s markets, the 
sector has also witnessed an intensive price competition, involving structurally 
declining sales prices. Consequently, the division is very much focused on cost 
control. Eureka’s division positions itself as a supplier of innovative quality products. 
The organization supports its quality image by presenting itself as a responsible 
corporate citizen that takes a progressive stance towards environmental issues. 
Eureka has had an environmental focus since 1993. The company first took a fairly 
defensive position, aiming merely at legal environmental compliance. Afterwards, it 
focused on eco-efficiency: the realization of both internal cost reduction and 
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improved environmental product performance (for example by reducing the quantity 
of packaging materials). Recently, Eureka has also embraced the principle of ‘green’ 
marketing: promoting the sales of its products by pointing to their favourable 
environmental performance. Eureka’s behaviour is — directly  and indirectly —  
oriented  towards customer satisfaction. A favourable environmental performance 
contributes to a positive customer assessment of Eureka’s products, though market 
research by Eureka’s national organizations has shown that only a minority (25%) of 
the division’s customers attribute some importance to environmentally related 
characteristics. According to Eureka’s current environmental mission statement, “the 
company is committed to continuously exploring solutions to successfully balance 
economy and ecology.” Important environmental issues include energy consumption, 
toxicity of inputs, packaging, and solid waste. Eureka has established targets for each 
of these areas: a 25% improvement of the energy efficiency of its products in the year 
2000 (as compared with reference year 1994), a 98% decrease of the most toxic inputs 
in 2002, a 15% reduction of packaging in 2000, and a 35% decrease of solid waste in 
2002. 
The environmental actions of Eureka’s focal division initially consisted of end-of-pipe 
measures, such as placing filters to avoid uncontrolled emissions of its waste streams. 
Afterwards, it engaged in controlled production, involving measures of good 
housekeeping. At present, the organization has embraced the principle of ‘green’ 
product design. This implies re-conceiving product specifications with the objective 
of realizing a more favourable environmental impact. The division’s action 
programme for the period 1998-2002 has taken products with an outstanding 
environmental performance as its cornerstone. Eureka’s division started integrating 
environmental aspects into its marketing activities in 1999. It conducted 
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environmental market and SWOT analyses. The major production-related measures 
are efficient product design (aimed at minimizing the total environmental impact of 
products throughout their entire life cycles), the use of secondary rather than virgin 
materials, careful production planning, efficient engineering, good housekeeping, 
adopting a formal environmental management system (ISO 14001), and requiring the 
division’s suppliers to abstain from supplying banned toxic substances.   
The division’s environmental performance in 2000 includes the following figures: a 
50% reduction of energy consumption, a complete elimination of the most toxic 
substances, a 15% decrease in packaging, and a 60% reduction of solid waste (as 
compared with the reference year). Outsiders perceive the focal division as 
progressive, outperforming its competitors in the environmental field. Eureka has 
been a member of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development since 
1993. It has published annual environmental reports since 1998. 
 
Environmental management structure 
Eureka’s focal division consists of five business units. In conjunction with sales, 
which is organized according to geographical regions, and purchasing, which is 
structured functionally, this yields a three-dimensional matrix structure (see Figure 1). 
The division’s bottom-line responsibilities are geographical. Environmental 
responsibilities are part of line functions. The environmental strategy is crafted at the 
divisional level, while its implementation has been delegated to local levels.  
Eureka’s focal division has environmental coordinators at the divisional, business 
unit, national, and subsidiary levels. The divisional coordinator is the head of an 
environmental staff group of some ten technical experts, who prepare divisional 
environmental plans and who provide support (training, facilities, technical advice, 
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manuals) to business units and others in the division. The environmental staff group’s 
revenues accrue from the sales of its environmental services to the different business 
units.  
Steering groups are standing committees that consist of representatives from business 
units, the divisional environmental staff group, purchasing, and marketing. Steering 
group meetings are chaired by Management Team (MT) members of the business 
units involved. The steering groups initiate, coordinate, and evaluate divisional 
environmental initiatives. They consider the overall environmental progress and 
stumbling blocks from different perspectives. During the quarterly steering group 
meetings, the divisional environmental coordinator brings in environmental proposals. 
Environmental targets, such as a particular reduction of energy consumption, are 
discussed within the steering groups. These discussions are inspired by information 
from national marketing departments on the environmental interest of customers, 
which is a central concern of Eureka. Commonly established targets are incorporated 
for implementation into environmental action plans. In a complex organization like 
Eureka’s focal division, action plans are an important tool for communicating 
between the different entities. They specify agreed targets, responsible persons, and 
time frames. The action plans are communicated throughout the division to all the 
internal actors involved.  
 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
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To implement the action plans, the purchasing department holds biweekly plan-do-
check-act meetings. They are necessary to initiate and evaluate the progress of 
environmentally inspired actions, such as requiring all of the division’s 1,500 
suppliers to provide technical evidence that they do not provide any banned toxic 
substances. Purchasing contracts are broken with suppliers of banned substances and 
with those who do not provide convincing negative evidence. Likewise, the division’s 
1,500 product developers, who come under the respective business units, have to 
incorporate the agreed environmental targets into their product specifications. They 
prescribe some 45,000 components for the division’s different products. Product 
developers spend 5-10% of their time on environmentally oriented product design. 
Because of the important financial implications, product development is a routinized 
process in which there is little tolerance for surprises. Experts are made responsible 
for newly formulated environmental targets (such as a particular reduction of energy 
consumption) and create teams to achieve these targets. Project groups are in charge 
of the realization of environmentally improved products. During their biweekly 
meetings, they consider all relevant aspects (such as product development, 
purchasing, and finance) and develop short-term action plans. With the help of 
manuals, which show examples of good environmental practices, solutions are 
tailored to the existing situations. In case the available technical knowledge falls 
short, a business unit addresses itself to one of the corporate research laboratories.  
These laboratories, employing some 3,000 persons, focus mainly on break-through 
innovations in a particular area (for instance, energy consumption). The laboratories 
are paid on a project basis by the different business units. Once a year, laboratory 
managers discuss quantitative research objectives with MT members of the respective 
business units. The objectives on which agreement is reached are then specified in 
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action plans. Progress is evaluated on a quarterly basis. These reviews regularly lead 
to the adjustment of established targets (for example, because innovations take more 
time or financial resources than expected). At the outset of a project, an extensive pre-
screening — involving  a literature study and the tracing of patents — takes place. If 
no external solutions to the existing problems are available, an ad hoc research team 
of technical specialists from a variety of fields gathers to brainstorm on possible 
solutions. The team evaluates the different options on the basis of three relevant 
factors: cost, utility, and risk. Decisions on the most promising ideas are taken by 
consensus. One or two persons subsequently become responsible for their elaboration. 
This occurs by means of physical experimentation and, increasingly, through 
computer simulation. The laboratory end products consist of measurement results, 
innovative concepts, and prototypes. They are documented for application throughout 
the company. Innovation projects take some two to three years, of which 5% is 
dedicated to the generation of new ideas and the rest to their elaboration. About 30% 
of all research outcomes are eventually applied in new products or processes. 
Inventions serve as inputs for product developers, who integrate and fine-tune them 
before coming to new product specifications. These specifications are written down in 
bills of materials, which purchasing and manufacturing departments have to respect 
when procuring inputs and producing outputs.  
 
The innovation process 
The sequence of events that eventually result in an innovation is highlighted in this 
subsection. We focus on one issue, the reduction of energy consumption, to describe 
the process of interaction among major external and internal constituencies that 
culminated in a product innovation. 
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External interactions 
In order to reduce the pace of global climate change induced by human intervention, 
the European Union (EU) and its member states have formally committed themselves 
to the reduction of ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions, in particular through the Kyoto 
Protocol (concluded in 1997). The products of Eureka’s focal division consume 
energy when used by their customers. As they contribute to global climate change, 
they are thus eligible for regulation. The European Commission (EC) takes regulative 
initiatives on behalf of the EU. Legislation is the conventional regulative mode, which 
has clear advantages in terms of committing all EU subjects and imposing relatively 
strict measures. But legislation is a lengthy, costly, and restrictive process. It takes 
several years, involves the consent or consultation of many parties (including EU 
member states, the European Parliament, and non-governmental organizations), and 
lacks flexibility (by imposing specific environmental measures). Moreover, legislation 
may not deteriorate the competitiveness of European industry. Therefore, the EC 
prefers concluding covenants with industry. This ‘soft’ regulation — which the EC 
calls ‘negotiated agreements’ — consists of performance-related targets (such as a 
particular percentage of energy reduction by a particular date) to which an industry 
commits itself. In return, industry has the flexibility of choosing measures and is 
exempted from (stricter) legislation.  
Before starting negotiations, the EC has to perform a study on the effects of the 
envisaged measures on the focal sector. This study is conducted by external experts, 
but requires input from industry (technical and financial data). While this renders the 
EC dependent on industry’s willingness to provide full and unbiased information, an 
EC representative trusts that industry understands its own interest in operating 
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transparently. Once the study is concluded, the EC consults with certain 
constituencies (such as environmental pressure groups and customer associations). 
After considering the interests of these interest groups, the EC sets desirable targets. 
This triggers a process of negotiation. The EC representative: “Ideally, you [the EC] 
want industry to agree with whatever measure you propose, but it’s never reality. So 
you always know that industry is trying to pull the other one down, to reduce the 
levels, and is never overenthusiastic. It is just a matter of negotiation with them.” 
Eureka’s divisional environmental coordinator shares this view: “With government, 
everything is a negotiation game.” 
The EC never negotiates with individual companies, only with supranational trade 
associations. The challenge of industry is to align the interests of companies with 
different technical and financial capabilities, visions, and cultural backgrounds. 
Hence, measures that involve unevenly distributed (technical) capabilities may lead to 
competitive disparities. Besides, the trade association has to gain support from a large 
majority of industry, because ‘free riders’ (i.e., non-participating companies) avoid 
legislation while having a competitive advantage due to their abstention from (costly) 
environmental measures. This disparity issue is particularly important in the focal 
sector because intensive competition has led to structurally declining sales prices and 
low profit margins. Thus, industry’s interest was to involve a large majority of 
suppliers and to obtain technically feasible measures that did not entail high additional 
costs. This common interest was stressed during the intensive negotiations that were 
conducted between the different suppliers; company-specific situations were not 
discussed. According to the representative of a company involved: “Where we think 
to outperform the competitor, we just remain silent about it, try to realize it with our 
products, and take a headstart in the market. (…) Only common threats are 
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discussable.” After a year of negotiations, 16 companies (covering 80% of the focal 
market) aligned themselves and signed an agreement with the EC to reduce the energy 
consumption of particular products by about 30% in 2000 (as compared with the 
reference year 1995).  
The environmental coordinator of Eureka’s focal division chairs the EU trade 
association. His intensive commitment, involving two days a week, stems from three 
motives. First, Eureka is in favour of harmonized European regulation. The division 
sells in all EU countries and wants to avoid country-specific technical standards 
(involving costly product adaptations).3) Second, Eureka is trying to establish the 
public image as an environmentally proactive company which takes measures that go 
beyond mere legislative compliance. By taking ‘voluntary measures’, the company 
thinks it can build a favourable environmental image, which fosters the sales of its 
products. The environmental coordinator: “We try to come to an agreement with them 
[the EC], so that there is a positive image of the company. This is transmitted through 
government to the [customer]. (…) We do everything for the [customer], but 
government is the means.” Third, active involvement offers the coordinator the 
possibility to steer regulation into a direction that is not unfavourable to the division’s 
interests.  
 
 
Internal commitment 
The realization of an external agreement does not necessarily bring about internal 
commitment. Major internal actors with different interests have to give their consent 
in the respective steering groups. This implies that the divisional environmental 
coordinator had to defend the externally negotiated agreement within his division to 
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show that the agreement was compatible with critical internal interests. The 
importance of presenting a convincing argument is obvious to the coordinator: “When 
I communicate very well, they go along. When I communicate very poorly, they 
quickly send me back home. I really regard it as a sales story. If I want to achieve 
something [in my division], I have to sell it very well. (…) Selling, in this case, means 
that I am capable of visualizing or quantifying the advantages for [Eureka].” 
The business unit MT is a crucial internal actor, whose support is indispensable. Profit 
is the business unit’s main objective; environmental initiatives should not thwart its 
realization. An MT member: “I stress profit; environment is a boundary condition 
with which I have to live.” This implies that the reduction of energy consumption 
should not significantly raise the cost price of the focal products (as sales price 
increases in the highly competitive markets were virtually excluded). Besides, the 
envisaged environmental measure was only one of the many new features that had to 
be incorporated into the new product conception cycle and that had to be technically 
compatible with one another. Thus, the business unit’s negotiation objective was to 
accept only measures that were expected to be technically feasible and not costly.  
The environmental agreement also had implications for the purchasing department. 
As the specifications of the focal product would change, the department had to 
procure other components. This change could involve a mixed environmental record. 
For example, an alternative component that reduces energy consumption may contain 
(banned) toxic substances. The purchasing department takes a cooperative stance in 
realizing environmentally benign measures. Purchasing was willing to procure 
components that allow for better energy performance, but did not want to face 
technical barriers (such as a poor toxicity record) or significant cost price increases. 
For such cases, the purchasing department had negotiated an escape clause that allows 
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for the (temporary) procurement of components with (specific) negative 
environmental aspects for which no alternatives were available at reasonably low 
prices.  
The marketing department is in favour of measures that foster a ‘green’ public image. 
Marketing argues that a highly visible company like Eureka cannot afford not to be in 
the lead in the environmental field. When customers can choose between two similar 
products, a significant number of them (25%) prefer the one with the superior 
environmental performance. So environmentally relevant features support sales, 
though the environmental sensitivity of customers varies from country to country. 
Energy consumption is also important for the marketing department because it is part 
of the product tests that customer associations regularly conduct. Products that 
perform poorly as to energy consumption cannot achieve the ‘best buy’ label, to 
which many customers are sensitive. Furthermore, environmental pressure groups try 
to dissuade customers from buying products with a poor environmental performance. 
Consequently, the marketing department supports environmentally benign initiatives 
like reduced energy consumption. For example, selected products with a very 
favourable environmental performance are more intensively promoted than other 
items. At the same time, marketing objects to measures that entail sales price 
increases because of the competitive markets on which the focal products are sold. 
Thus, the environmental coordinator’s room to manoeuvre is limited. He also has to 
operate delicately because his environmental staff group is financially dependent on 
the different business units, whose contributions to the staff group are negotiated on 
an annual basis. Yet, the divisional coordinator manages to skilfully walk the 
environmental tightrope. The business unit MT representative in the focal steering 
group: “[The environmental coordinator] really stands for environment, which he 
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radiates. He does it in a very realistic way. He understands that our organization 
cannot only take care of environment, that there should be a balance between profit 
and environmental awareness. Given [these constraints], he constantly pushes towards 
the environment. I find this very good.” According to the senior manager who 
represents the purchasing department in the steering group: “[The environmental 
coordinator] has the obligation to represent [our division] in the outside world, which 
is already a big fight of compromises. On the other hand, within [the division] there is 
also a fight of compromises between costs, market requirements, and environmental 
requirements. (…) His empowerment to enforce things within the organization is, of 
course, very low. (…) He needs diplomacy, politics, and optimal senior management 
involvement to keep the [environmental] objectives standing.”  The senior marketing 
manager resumes: “[The environmental coordinator] pushes us like hell [in the 
steering group]. He is very good at that.” 
 
The quest for new technology 
The environmental coordinator finally succeeded in ‘selling’ the external agreement. 
The steering group adopted the energy-reduction target, suspecting that it would not 
entail high costs or insurmountable technical barriers. The target was incorporated 
into the divisional action plan. When a newly adopted target goes beyond existing 
technical capacities (as was the case with the energy-reduction objective), the 
business unit in charge of its implementation identifies a research need. After a 
bottom-up process to take stock of the different needs, the business unit then evaluates 
and prioritizes the different options, and decides on the available research budgets. 
The business unit subsequently contacts one of the corporate research laboratories (in 
this case the one specializing in energy consumption). The laboratory and the business 
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unit negotiate the future research programme on an annual basis. Both the business 
unit and the laboratory present proposals for new research projects to which the 
respective parties attach importance. When a business unit makes a proposal (like the 
energy reduction project), the laboratory discusses how much the research costs are 
and how high it estimates the technical feasibility. For the business unit, an important 
condition for accepting the focal research project was that a technical solution could 
be found without significant cost price increases. A laboratory representative: “This is 
a fundamental parameter, what it may cost, already when agreeing upon the research 
programme. (…) To come to a low-cost solution, of which our colleagues from [the 
focal business unit] think that it will be accepted by the market. (…) [If not,] we could 
have difficulties to get such a research programme supported here.” The business unit 
and the laboratory finally agreed upon a research programme. Once the two parties 
come to terms, they specify their agreement as much as possible in quantitative 
targets. The laboratory starts generating and filtering possible solutions. It discusses 
the technical and financial implications of the most viable options on a quarterly basis 
with the business unit, which decides if it is still prepared to continue. It may also 
occur that altered external conditions (for example new market developments or other 
regulations) lead to a reformulation (and renegotiation) of the research targets.  
In the present case, the laboratory was allowed to proceed until it had elaborated a 
novel concept. This concept enabled a substantial reduction of the focal products’ 
energy consumption “under the very difficult boundary condition of cost [control]”, as 
a laboratory representative stated. The concept was passed on to the development 
department of the business unit, which applied it to the focal products. It should be 
noted that the realization of a low-cost solution was facilitated by the fact that the 
market demand for the components needed to reduce energy consumption had risen 
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enormously. Eureka’s competitors, committed to the same agreement with the EC, 
had engineered similar solutions and also started massively demanding similar 
components. This upsurge led to an important fall in the purchase price of these 
components, thus facilitating the realization of technical improvement without a 
substantial cost price increase.   
By incorporating the novel concept into the standard product specifications, the 
innovation became institutionalized in the division’s ‘ordinary’ economic activities. 
Owing to this product innovation, the relevant energy consumption of the focal 
products of Eureka’s division had dropped by more than 80% in 2000, well above the 
externally negotiated target of 30%. Figure 2 summarizes the process of interactions 
that led to the innovation.  
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The focal product innovation was the result of an interaction process among major 
external and internal actors. Many of their interactions consisted of negotiations, 
during which the respective parties tried to realize their own objectives as much as 
possible. The negotiation process critically shaped the ensuing product innovation. At 
many stages of this complex process, different options were open. They could have 
 25
led to different paths, many of which would have been fruitless. First, the EC could 
have chosen to impose legislation instead of negotiating a ‘voluntary’ agreement. 
Legislation is a more lengthy process, which would have postponed the trigger to 
engage in the search for product renewal. More importantly, legislation would have 
been much more restrictive regarding the technical options open to companies like 
Eureka to realize lower energy consumption. The legislative path would have 
involved prescriptions as to the type of technology to be implemented. Given the very 
dynamic technological environment and the numerous unknown technical parameters 
at the outset of the regulative process, prescription would have been a delicate choice.  
Eureka’s focal division would not have had the discretion to search for and realize a 
technically and economically very efficient solution, which clearly outperformed the 
initial expectations of all parties involved in the regulative process.  
Second, the outcome of the negotiations within the supranational trade association 
was critical to the regulative mode that the EC considered. The suppliers had partially 
divergent interests — owing to different objectives and capabilities — and certain 
companies were tempted to expose free-rider behaviour. Yet, industry managed to 
align 16 companies, representing 80% of all sales within the EU. If the trade 
association had not succeeded in mobilizing the support of a sufficient critical mass, 
the EC would have decided to proceed to legislation (despite the EC’s preference for a 
negotiated agreement).  
Third, the interactions within Eureka’s focal steering group were crucial to the 
division’s actions. The steering group had the formal power to reject the externally 
negotiated agreement, in which case the search for an innovation would not have been 
started. The purchasing department could have argued that no alternative components 
were on the market, thus precluding the possibility of material substitution. The 
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marketing department could have stated that environmental considerations played no 
significant role for customers, so that no efforts were needed. The focal business unit 
could have pointed to the competitiveness of the market, which did not allow for 
environmental measures entailing substantial cost increases. Rejection of the 
agreement with the EC was a real option because it was not legally binding. The 
steering group could also have redirected or further restricted the implementation of 
the agreement, for example, by excluding or imposing the use of particular 
components or technologies. Obviously, this would have had implications for the 
subsequently embraced (innovative) solution.  
Fourth, the negotiations between the focal business unit and the laboratory specialized 
in energy issues might have led to no research project. The business unit might have 
devoted too few resources to the research project, while the laboratory might have 
preferred to focus on other projects (as the laboratory also performed research for 
other business units and divisions). The research could also have been halted before 
bearing its fruits (for example, because the estimated probability of success was too 
low). Obviously, the failure to bring the research process to an end would not have led 
to product innovation.   
 
Our study has focused on one environmentally benign product innovation in a large 
company in a specific sector. We argue that our findings are also likely to hold in 
other settings. Many innovations have gone beyond the stage of the entrepreneurial 
inventor, who operates on a solitary basis. They often take place in large business 
organizations and involve many different actors. The involvement of a variety of 
internal actors stems from the complexity of the knowledge required to realize 
innovations, the important financial resources absorbed by R&D, as well as the 
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necessity to integrate requirements from purchasing, production, and marketing 
departments. Integration and alignment of behaviour requires motivated employees 
and shared norms, as Hargadon and Sutton (1997) showed for high-tech firms; it is 
likely that the establishment of common purposes and norms involves negotiations 
among employees, especially when high personal interests are involved. Likewise, 
communities of practice that share values in order to learn — which is a prerequisite 
for innovation — are exposed to power relations (Contu and Willmott, 2003); when 
actors are powerful but interdependent, negotiations are also likely to occur (cf. Gray, 
1999).  
Many innovations also call for the consideration of external parties. New products are 
often developed in alliances with other companies (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002); it 
is most likely that allies negotiate extensively before committing significant resources 
to such common projects. Standards shape product or process requirements 
throughout an industry (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000) and thus exert an important 
influence on the generation and diffusion of innovations; given the high stakes for the 
companies concerned, it is hard to conceive that these standards are established 
without extensive negotiations. New products also need outlets, which may involve 
consultations or negotiations with customers (Jolly, 1997; Vercauteren, 2004). 
Finally, novel processes or products have to be compatible with prevailing regulative 
frameworks; regulations are often the outcomes of protracted negotiations between 
authorities and companies (Lévêque and Nadaï, 1995). Whether innovations in 
complex settings involve internal and/or external parties, there seems to be an 
inherent tendency towards the creation of a new order following processes of, often 
intensive, negotiations (Latour and Woolgar, 1979).  
 
 28
The generalizable underlying mechanism for innovation as a complex negotiation 
process seems to be the interdependence of multiple, cognitively bounded actors who, 
despite their divergent interests, are engaged in direct interactions to exploit the 
available common ground as to the generation and application of new technology. 
The different parties hold unique resources that are all required to realize the 
innovation. The actors pursue their own objectives but also consider other parties, 
either because they are needed to realize the own goals or because they are 
unavoidable. The different actors ignore the exact extent to which others are prepared 
to compromise and, consequently, the overall outcome of the negotiation process in 
which they are engaged. Yet, the different actors realize that their own interests are 
best served by providing the inputs that are needed for the innovation at hand. The 
extent to which the innovation is shaped by the different parties depends on the 
prevailing distribution of power, which is reflected by their willingness to give and 
take in the negotiation process.  
A major implication of our study is that the outcome of an innovation process may be 
neither optimal, in the sense that it leads to the technically most advanced solution for 
a given amount of inputs, nor ‘satisficing’, in the sense that the optimal result is 
merely thwarted by limitations of time and cognition. Our study shows that 
innovation may be a non-linear, unpredictable process, the result of which is shaped at 
best by the largest common denominator. At different stages and loci of the 
innovation process, negotiations take place, which may be protracted and iterative. As 
the contingent outcomes of sub-level bargaining processes constitute inputs to other 
sub-level negotiations, the course of events may change during any stage of the 
negotiations (though several sub-level bargaining processes may take place 
simultaneously), after which the rest of the innovation process and its possible 
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outcomes are redirected; the process may even halt at any stage. As the different 
interactions are not aligned, the ensuing innovation — which is acceptable to all 
major parties involved — may be well below the solution that is (boundedly) optimal. 
  
The complex, dynamic negotiation process with contingent outcomes that leads to an 
innovation like the present one has not, or at least insufficiently, been highlighted in 
the literature. Companies have been described as collections of stakeholders with 
conflicting interests, in search of acceptable internal practices and external control of 
negotiated business environments (Cyert and March, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeffer, 
1992; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). These stakeholders often join forces with others, 
although the different members of coalitions may share only specific interests at 
particular points in time (Bacharach and Lawler, 1998; Murnighan, 1986; Pearce, 
Stevenson, and Porter, 1986). Stakeholders are continuously engaged in distributive 
and/or integrative bargaining to advance their own interests (Putnam, 1990). Actors 
involved in distributive bargaining compete for the largest possible share of a given 
collective outcome by exposing contentious behaviour and concealing relevant 
information. Those who bargain on an integrative basis aim at enlarging the overall 
payoff through collaboration, including collective brainstorming and open 
information sharing. The present case shows evidence of (coalitions of) stakeholders 
with divergent interests involved in both types of bargaining.  
While the behavioural perspective has offered rich insights, it has not directly 
addressed innovations that are shaped by stakeholders. Government-induced 
innovations have been described, but their triggers have been approached as ‘facts of 
life’. Innovative solutions have merely been represented as compliant responses to 
these inducements (cf. Kemp, 1997). Neither does the literature, especially in the field 
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of management, sufficiently discriminate between different types of regulation 
(including legislation and covenants) for innovation-related organizational behaviour. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the negotiations on regulative issues among 
companies within an industry and the innovative behaviour of companies has not been 
clearly established. For example, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) argued that strict 
environmental regulation induces companies to innovate their products and processes. 
Their starting point is stringent regulation, thus ignoring the preceding interactions 
between government and industry, as well as negotiations among companies in the 
same sector. Their analysis fails to differentiate between legislation and forms of 
regulation with more discretion, which has an impact on the direction of (innovative) 
solutions. 
 
The representation of the internal dynamics that lead to innovations also tends to be 
overly simplified. The literature tends to dichotomize as to the origin of innovations. 
On the one hand, relatively autonomous laboratories establish their own research 
agendas and ‘push’ new technologies on the market. On the other hand, business units 
respond to market incentives and ‘pull’ new products or processes from corporate 
laboratories. In more recent work, the combination of push and pull factors is given 
more attention. Furthermore, we find a growing number of publications that point at 
the importance of a combination of internal (R&D laboratories) and external 
(alliances, mergers, and acquisitions) knowledge acquisition for innovative renewal. 
However, with a few notable exceptions, the innovation literature fails to paint an 
overall picture in which the specific drivers and the role of particular internal and 
external actors in the innovation process are addressed. In an interesting contribution, 
Rothwell (1994) described the evolution of innovation along five key models. First-
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generation innovation is characterized by technology push, while need pull 
inducements are central to second-generation innovation. Third-generation innovation 
consists of coupling the formerly separate issues of push and pull. Fourth-generation 
innovation shows an integrated model with tight coupling between marketing and 
R&D departments, as well as strong linkages with key suppliers and leading 
customers. Finally, fifth-generation innovation is characterized by systems integration 
and networking models. This model includes strategic alliances with many other 
actors as well as the use of sophisticated expert systems. In spite of its major 
contribution, even this last representation of the innovation model fails to identify the 
many internal actors involved and the multi-faceted negotiations in which these actors 
are engaged at different stages.  
 
In conclusion, we have challenged conventional economic views of innovation by 
showing that a product innovation can emerge as the result of a complex bargaining 
process among a variety of external and internal actors with largely divergent 
interests. Such a representation of negotiated innovation seems to be unprecedented in 
the extant literature. Our argument was grounded in one extensive case study. Future 
research, focusing on external and internal interactions, may show whether this 
negotiation pattern recurs in other innovative settings. A further investigation into the 
‘negotiated order’ (Strauss, 1978) within the ‘black box’ of technology (Rosenberg, 
1982) seems to be necessary in order to come up with an increased understanding of 
the complex dynamics of innovation systems. 
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Notes 
 
1) Throughout this paper, the term ‘environment’ refers to the natural environment, 
unless preceded by an adjective (for example business environment). 
2) Unless indicated otherwise, the case description pertains to the situation in the year 
2000. 
3) For the same reason, Eureka concluded an alliance with a national government in 
another environmental field (waste recycling) to get a national environmental law 
accepted at the EU level. Eureka mobilized support within industry, while national 
government lobbied other governments. The allies succeeded in turning the national 
law into EU legislation. 
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Figure 1: Eureka’s environmental management structure
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Figure 2: Eureka’s innovation process 
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